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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between firm financial and investment decisions and 
regulatory outcomes in network industries, where regulatory opportunism is often viewed to 
lead to underinvestment. We develop a model to describe the effect of an increase in leverage 
on regulated rates, retail as well as wholesale, and company investment. We then test the 
model’s predictions using a panel of 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) over 
the period 1994-2005. Our results show that the data cannot reject the model’s predictions that 
leverage positively affects regulated wholesale and retail rates, as well as the PTOs’ investment 
rate. Moreover, since leverage does affect wholesale charges that alternative operators pay to 
access to the incumbent’s network infrastructure, we also find that an increase in leverage is 
followed by a decrease in the number of competitors and by an increase of the incumbent’s 
market share. This suggests that the use of debt to discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment 
within a vertically integrated network industry may somewhat impair or delay retail market 
competition, but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure investments are crucial in network industries because of their influence on prices and 
quantities in the long run, and because their delay generates enormous welfare costs.1  Regulation 
deeply affects firms’ investment decisions, especially when pro-competitive regulatory regimes are 
introduced.2 An instrument that regulators of vertically related utilities adopt to enhance 
competition in potentially competitive segments of public utility markets is the obligation to 
provide access to existing infrastructures - typically the network operated and maintained by the 
incumbent firm - to alternative operators at fair and non-discriminatory conditions. Access (or 
wholesale) regulation thus plays a fundamental role in vertically integrated markets, where the 
network is the essential facility for the provision of final services and network access is vital to 
encourage and sustain entry in the competitive segment of the market.  
Modern telecommunications are an interesting case to study because investment in new 
communication infrastructures calls for a large amount of capital expenditures, attracting regulatory 
concerns on third party access to networks. In addition, such an infrastructure investment is also 
acknowledged as a significant contributor to economic growth.3  
Since the liberalization of the telecom market, the debate on infrastructure investment has 
focused on the access of alternative operators to the existing network, as the key feature of the 
regulatory framework.4 We depart from existing studies because we introduce the capital structure 
decisions of the regulated incumbents in the interplay between access regulation and investment. 
Indeed, investment expenditures are affected not only by the regulatory framework, but also by 
firms’ financial stability. When the financial position of a regulated firm deteriorates, financial 
distress compromises the financeability of investments, as managers become concerned with 
solvency rather than with infrastructure expansion. Recently, a joint study of the UK Department of 
Trade and Industry and the HM Treasury (DTI-HM, 2004) has expressed serious concern about the 
                                                 
1 See Hausman (1997), Kessides (2004) and Guthrie (2006).  
2 See, for example, Alesina et al. (2005) who find that deregulatory reforms of product markets, and particularly entry 
liberalization, have a positive effect on investment. 
3 We refer here to the so called Next Generation Networks (NGNs) that will allow new ICT services to be delivered in 
bundle with voice services and broadband connection, and will require massive sunk investments in optical fibre 
connections. These investments are supposed to significantly contribute to the economic growth. Röller and Waverman 
(2001), using data from 21 OECD countries over a 20-year period, show that an increase of 10% in the broadband 
adoption rate leads on average to an increase of 2.8% of GDP growth. Koutroumpis (2009) shows that, for the EU-15 
countries from 2002 to 2007, the average impact of broadband infrastructure on GDP is 0.63%, i.e. 16.92% of total 
growth. Greenstein and McDevitt (2009) show that broadband accounted for $28 billion of US GDP in 2006, and they 
estimate that $20 to $22 billion was associated with household use. 
4 For example, among the others, Waverman et al. (2007) and Grajek and Röller (2009) find that wholesale rates 
regulation discourages infrastructure investment by both incumbents and entrants in fixed-line telecommunications. For 
a recent survey on the relationship between regulation and investment in telecoms, see Cambini and Jiang (2009). 
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“dash for debt” or “flight of equity” of UK utilities, including telecom incumbent British Telecom.5 
This paper analyses the relationships between firms’ financial and investment decisions and regulatory 
outcomes for a panel of 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) from 1994 to 2005.  
The financial exposition of Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) has increased to 
levels never seen in the last decades, and has become the hot issue in the industry. At the end of 
2005, the Financial Times wrote: “the telecommunications sector is in a particularly precarious 
position, with a number of companies facing the threat of being downgraded to junk status. In this 
sector, 50 per cent of the companies have negative outlooks or are on credit watch with negative 
implications”6. After 2005, this situation became even worse: at the end of 2008, the net debt 
position of Deutsche Telekom totaled 41 billion of euros, France Telecom 36 billion of euros, 
Telecom Italia 34 billion of euros, British Telecom 11 billions and, at the top, Telefonica de Espana 
reported 45 billion of euros. In addition, new bonds for 45 billion of euros are going to be issued in 
2010-2011 to finance European telecoms operators’ investments. Such anecdotal evidence suggests 
that, following telecom markets’ reforms, the incumbents have mostly relied on debt capital to 
pursue their growth strategies. Our paper attempts to throw some light on the reason why these 
firms increased financial leverage to the point of raising policy-makers’ concern and, more 
specifically, on the potential interference of such debt levels with regulatory decisions.     
The relevance of firm’s capital structure decisions in regulator’s price setting outcomes 
derives from the need to ensure regulated firms a “fair rate of return” on their investments. This fair 
rate of return depends, among other things, on the firm’s cost of capital, which in turn depends on 
the firm’s capital structure. Therefore regulated firms can affect their prices by appropriately 
choosing their capital structure.  
There are two conflicting views on the link between capital structure and regulated prices. 
The first view stems from the observation that in practice, regulators both in the EU and the US 
often use the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) in computing the firm’s cost of 
capital which regulated price is designed to cover. Taggart (1981) shows that as long the allowed 
return to equity exceeds the after-tax imbedded cost of debt, the regulated firm can induce price 
increases by substituting equity for debt. The positive effect of equity on regulated price would in 
turn generate a strong incentive for regulated firms to prefer equity to debt financing. 
                                                 
5 In the same vein, the Italian Corte Dei Conti (National Audit Office) in February 2010 voiced a similar opinion: 
“Privatized firms strategically increase the risk of insolvency in order to obtain higher tariffs to finance investments. 
The regulated firm uses leverage as a commitment device vis-à-vis the regulator to maintain a high level of 
profitability”, (p. 195; the entire document can be found at the link: http://www.cnim.it/cnimnm/articlefiles/407-
Privatizzazioni%20definitivo%20-%20relazione.pdf). 
6 Cited in “European company debt at five-year high”, by D. Oakley, The Financial Times, November 3rd, 2006. 
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Alternatively, when regulators cannot commit not to review ex post the regulated rates, 
theoretical models by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Spiegel (1994) identify debt financing as a 
strategic mechanism that affects the regulator – regulated firm interaction. Regulators’ lack of 
commitment is a typical feature of utility industries, which often leads to underinvestment (Besanko 
and Spulber, 1992). In this setting, if regulators start worrying about the financial stability of the 
incumbent operator, they may become more cautious to reduce ex post regulated rates as firm’s 
financial debt increases; high leverage may thus shield the firm against the regulator’s opportunistic 
behavior. The choice of the capital structure is thus viewed as an instrument that can be used to 
discipline the time inconsistency of regulatory interventions and to solve the underinvestment 
problem originating from regulatory opportunism. Empirical evidence on the strategic use of debt is 
provided by Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel (2011, BCRS hereafter) who show, for a large 
panel of EU utilities, that higher leverage leads to higher retail price, whenever the regulated firm is 
subject to an independent regulator and privately controlled. 
In this paper, we analyze the strategic use of leverage and its impact on regulated rates, retail 
as well as wholesale, and company investment. We first present a simple theoretical framework that 
combines Spiegel (1994)’s model of capital structure choice in a regulated environment with 
Laffont and Tirole (1994)’s model of social optimal choice of wholesale rates in a vertically related 
industry. We thus derive theoretical predictions to analyze the impact of the incumbent’s capital 
structure on both retail and wholesale rates, on the degree of competition in the retail segment and, 
finally, on the PTO’s investment. We then move to the econometric analysis, testing, on a panel of 
15 European PTOs from 1994 to 2005, whether the data support the model’s theoretical predictions 
or alternative explanations for the role of capital structure of regulated firms. The sample is not 
large, but includes the EU member states that, starting from the mid Nineties, first experienced 
market reforms in the telecoms industry, such as the establishment of Independent Regulatory 
Agencies, the gradual liberalization of some market segments, vertical (accounting and legal) 
separation and access rate regulation. The starting point of the empirical analysis investigates 
whether key features of the regulatory environment - the intensity of regulation and market entry 
conditions - affect either the capital structure or the fixed capital investment of the incumbent 
PTOs’ while also controlling for regulatory climate, as proxied by government’s political 
orientation.  We then proceed with the econometric tests of the model’s predictions. First, we test 
the relationships between financial leverage and wholesale and retail regulated charges. Second, we 
focus on market structure.  Since the incumbent operator is vertically integrated, the access charge 
affects the alternative operators’ marginal cost for the provision of retail services, but not the 
marginal cost of incumbent firm. Should leverage influence the regulated access charge, 
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competition in the retail segment would also be affected. We thus investigate the relationship 
between firm leverage and the number of competitors in the retail segment and, alternatively, the 
incumbent’s market share in the retail market.  Thirdly, we investigate the interaction between debt 
and investment of fixed telecoms operators. We deal with endogeneity problems by applying the 
GMM estimator when dynamic models are estimated, and by using lags of internal right-hand 
variables as well as institutional, regulatory and political variables as instruments. 
The econometric results show that the model’s predictions cannot be not rejected by our 
data, i.e. that an increase in leverage positively affects regulated rates, both at the retail and at the 
wholesale level. We then find that increases in leverage have a negative impact on competition, but 
a positive effect on the PTOs’ investment rate. When we estimate the long run effects of a leverage 
increase on retail and wholesale prices as well as on company investments we find that they are 
quantitatively large.  Our interpretation of these results is that within a vertically integrated network 
industry, the strategic use of debt to discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment may somewhat 
impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the 
underinvestment problem.  
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we present the theoretical framework 
and the testable predictions, which we derive in the model described in the technical appendix. In 
section 3, we explain the institutional background for the EU-15 telecommunication industry and 
the changing pattern of market competition and of interconnection rates in European countries.  In 
section 4 we describe the dataset and the firm level variables. In section 5 we present the 
econometric results. Section 6 summarizes the main results and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and empirical predictions 
Primary goals of regulation are to promote competition and to enhance social welfare 
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). A major drawback, however, is the conflict between social and 
private interests that arises whenever pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing regulatory regimes 
may undermine the firm’s incentives to invest and maintain the infrastructure.7 This tension is 
typical of the telecom industry where adequate provision of the service requires large amounts of 
investment that is both irreversible and risky, and uncertainty in the regulatory framework can 
further deprive utilities’ incentives to invest.  
                                                 
7 In their book, Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 7) note that: “There is in general a trade-off between promoting 
competition to increase social welfare once the infrastructure is in place and encouraging ex ante the incumbent to 
invest and maintain the infrastructure”. 
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When regulators cannot commit to long-term regulated prices, they may have an incentive to 
behave opportunistically, i.e. to cut prices once the firm’s investments are sunk, in order to benefit 
consumers at the expenses of the firm’s owners. Economic literature has analysed the time-
inconsistency problem in regulation, i.e. the so- called hold-up problem (Besanko and Spulber, 
1992). One strand of this literature has introduced the capital structure decision as a potentially 
useful instrument to limit regulatory opportunism (Spiegel and Spulber, 1994, Spiegel 1994).8  By 
allowing the firm to become highly leveraged and exposed to financial distress, the regulator will 
discipline the lack of commitment problem, tying his/her own hands not to reduce the regulated 
rates ex-post, thus re-establishing the firm’s incentives to invest. Therefore, debt financing may lead 
to higher regulated prices while at the same time encouraging regulated firms to increase their 
investment outlays.  Following these predictions, BCRS (2011) investigate the relationship between 
capital structure and regulated retail prices for a large panel of EU utilities in energy, 
telecommunication, transport and water industries from 1994 and 2005. They find that i) EU 
utilities tend to increase their leverage following the introduction of an Independent Regulatory 
Authority (IRA), provided they are privately-controlled, and ii) higher leverage leads to higher 
regulated rates, i.e. leverage Granger-causes regulated prices when firms are privately controlled 
and regulated by an IRA.  
The market structure of telecom industry in many European countries is characterised by an 
upstream monopolistic network segment and a downstream retail segment where a dominant 
incumbent (in our example, the PTO) competes with alternative operators. This feature introduces 
an interesting twist in the strategic interaction between the regulator and the regulated incumbent 
firm, because the regulator may choose whether to “tie his own hands” with respect to the access 
price or with respect to the retail charge, or with respect to both.  In this paper, we thus build on 
existing research, but adding two contributions.  First, we extend the analysis to the vertical 
structure of many integrated utilities, typical of the telecommunications industry, and to regulatory 
interventions on wholesale – i.e. access – rates. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
analyzes and empirically tests the relationship between financing decisions and regulated wholesale 
charges.9  Second, we analyse the relationship between capital structure and investment decisions, 
                                                 
8 The use of debt as a commitment device was first examined, in an oligopoly setting, by Brander and Lewis (1986). 
9 The IO literature has long analyzed the reasons and the economic conditions of ex ante intervention in granting access 
to an essential facility managed by the PTOs. Most of the literature on access regulation focuses on the definition of 
optimal price mechanism where asymmetric information is the most serious problem vexing the regulator-PTO 
relationship (Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Armstrong, 2002; Vogelsang, 2003, among others). Other papers study the 
impact of retail market deregulation and incumbent’s vertical structure (integration vs. separation) on regulated access 
charges (Colombo and Rossini, 1997; Spulber and Sidak, 1997). We did not find papers that analyze the impact of 
capital structure decisions on the wholesale rates setting process. 
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testing the prediction implicit in Spiegel and Spulber (1994) that higher leverage leads to higher 
investment.    
Whether the regulator responds to the incumbent’s precarious financial position by adjusting 
the access or the retail charge, or both, will also have a consequence for competition in the 
downstream segment and, in turn, for the incumbent’s investment incentives.  In order to derive 
testable predictions in this complex framework, we develop a stylized model, reported in the 
Appendix, that combines the Spiegel (1994)’s model of capital structure choice in a regulated 
environment with the Laffont and Tirole (1994)’s model that studies the optimal social choice of 
wholesale rate in a vertically related industry. The model considers a vertically integrated firm 
operating both in the upstream and downstream segment of an industry. In the upstream market, the 
firm runs a network whose access represents the essential input for the provision of retail services. 
In the downstream market, the incumbent operator competes with a fringe of alternative operators. 
Moreover, the alternative operators need access to the existing network to provide the final service. 
The access charge is therefore subject to regulation by a benevolent regulator, who is not able to ex 
ante fully commit to his price setting decisions. Following Spulber (1989), the access charge is set 
by using a bargaining process between the firm, which is interested in maximizing its profit, and the 
regulator, who is interested in maximizing consumers’ surplus. The model provides the following 
results: as far as the regulated charges are concerned, the higher is the debt issued by the firm, the 
higher is the regulated access charge set by the regulator and, in turn, the higher is the regulated 
retail price. This leads to our first testable Hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The regulated wholesale charges and retail prices both increase with the firm’s debt. 
 
If the level of debt positively affects the wholesale rate, then it will also affect the quantity 
sold by alternative operators in the downstream segment, since their marginal cost for providing the 
final service will also increase. On the contrary, the vertically integrated incumbent operator will 
only pay the true marginal cost of the service, which is likely to be lower than the marginal cost 
faced by the alternative operators whenever the regulated access charge is not entirely “cost 
oriented” and firms are equally efficient in the downstream segment. Then, the incumbent could 
rely on debt not only to influence the regulator’s price setting decision, but also to put the rivals at 
disadvantage. We thus have the second testable Hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Market competition in the retail segment becomes weaker as the regulated firm 
issues more debt. 
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The reason why regulators allow the regulated charges to increase with debt is to tie their own 
hands and reduce their own ex post opportunism. Insofar as debt can shield the incumbent from ex 
post opportunism by the regulator, debt will enhance ex ante investment incentives and reduce the 
underinvestment problem. As argued by Spiegel and Spulber (1994, p. 436)10, debt influences 
investment because “the regulator will permit firms to take on debt only if debt increases the firm’s 
ex ante investment level”.  This leads us to the third testable Hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the debt issued by the regulated firm, the higher the firm’s investment 
rate. 
 
Finally, the quality and the intensity of the regulatory environment as well as the social 
welfare objectives in the government’s agenda may also affect the action and the stance of the 
regulator – i.e. whether pro-firm or pro-consumers, pursuing static or dynamic efficiency, etc. As 
recently emphasized by the literature (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Edwards and Waverman, 2006), the 
degree of regulatory independence (either from the government in charge or from the regulated 
firm/incumbent) enhances the commitment powers of regulators and reduces the uncertainty of 
regulatory interventions, thus playing a key role in utilities’ investment decisions even though 
excess intensity of regulation might negatively affect investment (Grajek and Röller, 2009). Finally, 
the relationship between regulators and politicians can be especially important in European 
countries, where regulators are appointed by governments and not elected by citizens (Henisz and 
Zelner, 2001; Henisz, 2002).  Even if the regulator is formally independent from politicians, in fact, 
the political orientation of the elected government may influence not only the regulator’s activity 
(and make it more or less pro-firm or pro-consumers), but also the regulated firm’s investment and 
financing decisions (for example stock markets typically react differently to right or left-wing 
governments). Since we recognize the importance of the regulatory and political environment, we 
will also consider their impact in the empirical analysis.   
                                                 
10 More precisely, in Spiegel and Spulber (1994)’s model, like in our simplified framework, the choice of optimal 
investment and capital structure is simultaneous. Then, it should not be possible to derive a one-way causal relationship 
between debt and investment. However, their model shows that debt is an instrument the regulated firm could use to 
shield itself against the regulator ex post opportunism. Therefore, our prior is that as long as debt increases, the 
regulator behaves less opportunistically and the firm, anticipating this, invests more. Obviously, if our hypothesis is not 
correct, and so debt and investment are mutually determined, then we would empirically find either no relationship 
between the two, or that debt causes investment and viceversa, hence a simultaneous relationship.  
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3 The telecommunication industry in the EU  
3.1 Institutional background and legislative framework  
In the last twenty years, rapid evolution of telecommunication technology and fast growing demand 
for telecom services have led to intense changes in both market structure and regulatory framework.  
Many European countries, following the earlier UK experience, have liberalised the domestic 
market and privatised public telecommunications operators.11 Retail markets are now liberalized 
while public telecom operators are controlled by private investors and regulated by an Independent 
Regulatory Authority in most countries. Many incumbent operators reacted to market reforms by 
expanding in both horizontally and vertically related markets, investing in fixed broadband 
networks and acquiring expensive spectrum rights for mobile services. The PTOs also pursued 
corporate growth strategies through mergers and acquisitions that were largely financed through 
debt.12  
From the start, a key concern of the newly established IRAs was that the design of the 
regulatory framework could guarantee potential entrants both access to and interconnection with the 
network, since this crucial asset used to belong (and still does) to the incumbent fixed 
telecommunication operators. Since 1998, many telecom services have been liberalized and 
deregulated, the most prominent example being the retail services.13 In 2003, telecom services for 
specific traffic directions - mainly international calls – and specific client categories – mainly 
business users – were also gradually deregulated.  However, at the end of 2005, price regulation of 
voice services for household users (through price caps or other forms of tariff approval) was still in 
place in many EU countries14 and PTOs were (and still are) under tight regulatory obligations on 
wholesale services. In December 2007, the European Commission revised the regulatory framework 
                                                 
11 The regulatory framework has changed over time following the technological and competitive evolution of the 
industry. Formally, liberalization in the telecommunications market kicked off in the late ‘80s, with the Green Paper for 
the Development of the Common Market for telecommunication services and equipment (1987). In the early ‘90s the 
EC issued a number of Directives dealing with the telecoms sector. But the fundamental piece of EC legislation for 
TLC is Directive 96/19, the so-called Full Competition Directive, which opened up the market for voice telephony 
starting from January 1st, 1998 and ruled that every member state should have an Independent Regulatory Authorities 
for telecommunications industry.   
12 For example, Telefonica de Espana, acquired the fixed operator Cesky in the Cech Republic and the British mobile 
operator O2 from British Telecom, for a total amount of approximately 26 billion €, at the same time when it started 
investing in new broadband (DSL) connections. In 2000, France Télécom acquired the German mobile operator Orange 
for 46 billion €. In Italy and Germany, Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telekom began to deploy high-speed connections 
and merged, each, with their mobile subsidiary (TIM and T-Mobile, respectively). In 1999, the Swedish operator Telia 
merged with the Norwegian one, Telenor and, in 2002, with the Finnish incumbent, Sonera. 
13 Due to these developments, in 2002 the EU Commission issued four Directives (the Framework, the Authorization, 
the Access and the Universal Service Obligation Directive2002/19-22/EC) which set up a new regulatory framework 
and introduced a new approach relying on “ex post” rather than “ex ante” intervention especially at retail level (Buigues 
and Rey, 2004). 
14 In 2006, Denmark, Finland and UK, fully deregulated retail charges while in Italy, France and Spain, price caps 
became gradually less tight. For detailed information, see the OECD report (2006) and Table 10 therein. 
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in order to limit ex ante intervention at the retail level, and to focus, instead, on access and 
interconnection services (Recommendation 2007/879/EC). At present, access and interconnection 
issues are the bulk of regulatory intervention in the telecoms industry. 
3.2 Market evolution and interconnection rates in Europe  
European Commission’s reports on the Implementation of European Electronic 
Communication Regulatory Framework (EC, 1998 – 2006) provide useful information about the 
degree and type of competition faced by European incumbent operators in the time span we are 
considering. By the end of 2005, only 7 countries have more than four relevant competing 
operators, i.e. “alternative operators that together with the incumbent, control a combined market 
share of 90%” as defined by the EC reports, and the average market share (in terms of revenues) of 
incumbent operators in EU-15 is 77% in the national segment. Moreover, alternative operators tend 
to concentrate their business on specific segments of the market, such as business users, or to 
restrict their activity to specific services (long distance calls – national and international) or 
geographic areas, thus carrying just a limited impact on the total national market. Therefore, 
competition is largely asymmetric and incumbents still dominates the retail voice telephony market 
that represents the relevant product market in the telecom industry within the period 1994-2005. 
Operators compete on retail services rather than on alternative infrastructures (EC, 2006; 
figure 19): at the end of 2005, direct access to alternative providers was used only by 7.7% of EU15 
subscribers. Alternative proprietary infrastructures are very limited and direct access is primarily 
due to the so called local loop unbundling (LLU), which forces alternative operators to spend large 
(and sunk) amounts of money to install their equipment at local exchanges (owned by the 
incumbent), and to rent only the very last mile (the loop) from the incumbent. By the end of 2005, 
only the 8% of total lines were unbundled in Germany, 5% in Italy, and 2% in France (COCOM, 
2006) and even more recently LLU is still limitedly used in most EU countries, confirming its 
complex application (EC, 2007; COCOM, 2007). Therefore, in the 1998-2005 period, telecom 
companies still compete over the provision of services rather than on duplication of alternative 
facilities, and alternative operators rely on access to the incumbent’s network at various levels of 
the multi-layered network structure.15  
                                                 
15 Alternative operators can route users to their network either through a carrier selection system (CS), i.e. user dials a 
prefix on a call-by-call basis, or by carrier pre-selection (CPS), where the user’s calls are routed to the new entrants’ 
network on an automatic basis. These are mainly non-infrastructured modes of entry and they were highly used by 
alternative operators in all Europe. For example, at the end of 2005, CPS was used in Italy by 100% of alternative 
operators, 92% in UK, 67% in France, 87% in Belgium and 40% in Germany (EC, 2006). In recent years, many 
alternative operators have shifted towards more infrastructured modes of entry and CPS and CS lost their importance. 
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From the beginning of the liberalization process, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
have two major concerns: to efficiently regulate access rates so as to avoid any potential advantage 
for the vertically integrated incumbent operator and to level the playing field among competitors. In 
addition, the EU Commission requires that interconnection rates be “cost orientated” in order “to 
encourage efficient entry and a rapid development of an open and competitive market” (Directive 
97/33/EC, art. 7). Alternative operators wishing to provide retail voice services – still the relevant 
market in the period 1994-2005 - may accede to the incumbent’s fixed network through different 
wholesale services, like local access and single tandem interconnection. The choice among 
interconnection modes depends on the portion of network the entrants want to use.  Local access is 
needed when the entrant uses its own infrastructure to reach the local exchange nearest the party 
being called; the alternative operator thus rents only a limited fraction (the core distribution 
network) of the incumbent’s network and creates its own network for transporting calls all over the 
country. If instead the entrant has not invested in proprietary infrastructure, a larger fraction of the 
incumbent’s network must be rented. In this case, single tandem interconnection is used to 
terminate calls anywhere in a metropolitan area. Single tandem interconnection was, at least up to 
2007, the most widely used entry method in Europe and single tandem rates may be, accordingly, 
viewed as the reference interconnection rates for most European countries (see ERG, 2007).16 
Overall, revenues from sales of these wholesale services are very high in the period we consider, 
covering approximately from 20% to 25% of PTO’s total revenues.17 
 
4. The data 
Our dataset comprises firm level variables for 15 publicly traded Public Telecommunication 
Operators (PTOs) from 14 EU countries that earlier introduced market reforms in the telecom 
industry thus enabling us to conduct our econometric tests on the period from 1994 to 2005 (firms 
are listed in the Appendix A.3).  We construct our dataset by merging accounting and financial firm 
level data from Worldscope with industry and country level variables from various sources: 
wholesale charges from the European Commission (DG XIII, Telecommunications Regulatory 
                                                 
16 Double tandem interconnection, the third level of access to the existing network, allows alternative operators that 
only have a single point of interconnection, to enter the incumbent’s network and terminate their calls anywhere in the 
network. This access mode is for alternative operators that have not invested in any proprietary infrastructure, and was 
mainly used at the beginning of the liberalization process. Double tandem interconnection lost its relevance as market 
competition increased, so we focus on the mostly used access services. Local loop unbundling is an access method 
recently introduced to provide Internet access. 
17 The importance of wholesale services in terms of traffic is even higher: in Italy, for example, we observe an average 
of 180 billions of national calls’ minutes per year in the period 1998-2005, and approximately 80 billions of wholesale 
minutes of traffic. 
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Package); retail price indexes from Eurostat and fixed investment price deflators from OECD; the 
extent of regulation of market entry from the OECD International Regulation database (Conway 
and Nicoletti, 2006); and the intensity of specific market regulation from Plaut Economics 
(Zenhausern, Telser, Vaterlaus, Mahler, 2007).  
The theoretical implications of the model focus on three variables, regulated prices, financial 
indebtedness, and fixed investment.  Retail prices at the individual firm level are not available, 
therefore we use price indexes, which cover both the change in traffic (usage) charges for local, 
national and international calls and the change in monthly fixed fees.  Because in the newly 
liberalized market regulators had to enforce “tariff rebalancing”,18 the different components of the 
typical “telecom bill” followed opposite trends: fixed monthly fees increased over time while usage 
charges decreased. As for wholesale charges, we use the access rates on the incumbent’s fixed 
network for local level and for single transit in € cents per minute (see Section 3.2).  Technological 
change and fast-growing productivity of telecom operators have influenced both retail and 
wholesale rates through the (price and network) cap mechanism.19  
To define indebtedness we consider measures that capture the risk of the default. Our 
preferred variable is therefore the textbook definition of leverage, i.e. the book value of financial 
debt (both long- and short-term) divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the book value of 
equity.20 Alternatively, we also construct the total financial debt to total assets ratio (debt-to-assets) 
and the total financial debt to sales, which we use for robustness checks.  The investment rate is the 
ratio of gross fixed investment to capital stock at the replacement value.21 Investments include 
changes in the capital stock due to capital expenditures in infrastructures and equipment as well as 
                                                 
18  Before the telecom market was liberalised and PTOs were privatised, operators and regulators used to set prices for 
connection as low as possible. Prices for other services, such as national and international calls, were kept high in order 
to subsidize low connection fees. This form of cross-subsidization was no longer sustainable in a liberalised market and 
many regulators started “rebalancing the telecoms bill”, i.e. revising each single tariff component (both usage charges 
and the fixed fee). Typically, the purpose of this regulatory intervention is to ensure that the price for each service 
reflects the underlying cost of providing that service. For a general description, see Crandall and Waverman (1996).  
19 In the working paper version of this paper (Cambini and Rondi, 2009) we calculated both the Labour Productivity 
index and the Total Factor Productivity Index in order to estimate efficiency increases over the period 1994-2005. We 
found that on average labour productivity increased by 11.2% (standard deviation=0.40) and TFP increased by 9.1% 
(0.12). 
20 We also constructed the Market Leverage i.e. the ratio between the book value of financial debt (both long- and short-
term) and the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. However we opted for the book leverage 
because we would lose about 20% of the observations due to missing data for market capitalization. See Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) for a discussion of alternative leverage measures.  
21 The accounting data from Worldscope only include historic cost valuations of fixed assets, which usually bear little 
relation to current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the replacement cost of the 
capital stock using the perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-δ)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, where pt is the country-specific 
implicit price deflator for gross capital formation in period t sourced by the OECD, Kt is the fixed capital stock in period 
t, It is the investment flow in period t, and δ is the depreciation rate. For the depreciation rates, applied a constant rate of 
8% for telecommunications, as derived from Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates reported in “Rates of 
Depreciation, Service Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and Hulten-Wykoff Categories”.  
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new capital goods by acquisitions, or divestitures. Figure 1 shows the ascending trend of the 
average financial leverage from 1994 to 2005 while Figure 2 reports the average investment rates. 
The pattern is very irregular from 1995 to 1999, collapsing in 1996 and 1997 just before the EU 
directives on liberalization were issued. Investment rates then increase more smoothly from 1999 to 
2003 and again decrease in 2004.  
Our dataset also includes country and industry specific variables to cover institutional 
features of the regulatory and political environment.  
The Plaut Economics “Regulatory Intensity Index” for the telecommunication industry 
(Zenhausern et al. 2007) measures, for each country, to what extent industry characteristics and 
firms’ operations are subject to regulation as well as the toughness of regulation.  It accounts for 
features that may be relevant for investment incentives, such as market entry, density and 
enforcement of price and quantity regulation. It ranges from 0 (low intensity) to 1 (high intensity) 
and it varies over time.  
The OECD index of Market Entry (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) is the country-specific sub-
indicator of the OECD Product Market Regulation Database that covers the legal and economics 
terms and conditions of third party access – hence potential competition- into the fixed 
telecommunication industry. The index varies from 0 (most) to 6 (least liberalized) as well as over 
time and is an index of the degree of market openness and liberalization rather than an index of the 
quality or scope of regulation.   
The Political orientation index (see Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009) measures the political 
orientation of the executive in charge, from extreme leftwing (when it takes the value of 0) to 
extreme rightwing (the value is 10), is computed as the weighted average of the right-left political 
orientation scores of the parties forming the executive branch of the government. Higher values of 
the political orientation index are typically associated with more pro-firm policies.22  
All these indices vary both over time and across countries, thus providing a further control 
of the changing institutional and regulatory environment. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for 
the variables we use in the econometric analysis.   
 
5. Empirical analysis 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between capital structure, investment 
and regulatory outcomes for the 15 European PTOs in a period in which product and process 
                                                 
22 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for a general review of the impact of partisan politics and ideology on economic 
policies. Leftwing parties are rarely associated with market-oriented policies, while rightwing parties are more in favor 
of deregulation and less inclined to sustain consumers’ interest than leftwing parties (see also Benoit and Laver, 2006). 
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innovation and market reforms deeply changed both the telecommunications industry and its 
regulatory environment. We thus start by investigating to what extent such institutional and 
regulatory changes influenced the PTOs’ investment and capital structure decisions, and then 
proceed by estimating the dynamic interactions between leverage, investment, regulated rates and 
market competition.  For this specific purpose, we will perform Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) 
causality tests that will allow us to assess whether higher leverage leads to higher prices, higher 
investment and to weaker competition, or viceversa.23      
5.1. Leverage and Fixed Investment of the 15-EU PTOs in the new regulatory 
environment  
5.1.1 Leverage 
In this section, we estimate a simple leverage model that includes firm characteristics that 
were shown in the empirical corporate finance literature to be reliable determinants of capital 
structure24 and, to cover institutional changes, the OECD Market Entry and the Plaut Regulatory 
Intensity indexes. Interestingly, the Regulatory Intensity index also allows us to test whether 
leverage increases when the scope and severity of regulation toughens, which may be viewed as the 
necessary condition underlying the Hypothesis 1 that leverage positively affects regulated charges. 
Finally, we add the Political Orientation index, to investigate potential interference with regulatory 
decisions by the government’s political stance. 
The set of firm specific variables includes the log of real total assets to control for firm’s 
size (size is typically shown to have a positive effect of leverage, also because largest firms are less 
likely to go bankrupt), the ratio of fixed to total assets which reflects asset tangibility (tangible 
assets can serve as collateral and hence lower the cost of debt financing), the ratio of EBIT 
(earnings before interests and taxes) to total assets which is a proxy for profitability and 
“efficiency” (more efficient firms are likely to have higher earnings with the same assets), and the 
ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets as a proxy for non-debt tax shields (tax 
                                                 
23 Granger causality tests have been increasingly employed in the recent regulation literature.  For example, Alesina et 
al. (2005) study the causal relationship between the intensity of product market regulation and investments in 21 OECD 
countries; Edwards and Waverman  (2006) test the relation between interconnection rates and regulatory independence 
in the EU-15 member states from 1997 to 2003; Gasmi, Noumba and Recuero Virto (2006) study the impact of political 
accountability on performance in telecommunications for 52 developed and developing countries while Gasmi and 
Recuero Virto (2008) test the relationship between telecommunications reforms and network expansion in developing 
countries; Resende (2009) tests the relationship between investment and long term debt for US telecoms from 1992 to 
1998 while BCRS (2011) test the relationship between leverage and regulated retail price indexes for 92 utilities from 
1994 to 2005.  
24 For common firm characteristics that are included in leverage regressions see for example, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Fama and French (2002), and Frank and Goyal (2009).  
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deductions for depreciations are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing).  The estimated 
equation takes the following form:  
 
Levit =α0 +α1Sizeit +α2Tangibilityit +α3Profitabilityit+α4NonDebt Tax Shieldit+ 
+α5OECDMarketEntryjt (or α5RegulatoryIntensityjt) +α6PoliticalOrientationjt +µi+ δt +εit  (1) 
 
where µi denotes the firm dummies, δt denotes the time-specific dummies, i, j and t are the firm, 
country and year subscripts, and εit is the error term. Table 2 reports the fixed effect estimates where 
both firm and time specific fixed effects are included.  
Column (1) reports the results for the baseline specification, excluding the institutional 
variables. Both firm size and tangibility of assets enter with a significant coefficient. While the 
positive coefficient on firm size is quite typical, as largest firms are expected to find it easier to 
raise more debt, the negative coefficient on tangibility is in contrast with earlier studies, as tangible 
assets are thought to serve as a collateral and hence to lower the cost of debt financing. In our 
sample of PTOs, however, fixed capital investments are highly firm- and industry- specific, sunk 
and non-redeployable and may therefore serve as poor collateral. We then turn to the impact of the 
institutional variables. In Column (2) we enter the Political Orientation index to control for the 
likely influence of politics on the regulatory climate and find that the coefficient is negative and 
significant. This result suggests that the PTOs tend to reduce leverage when the government is 
rightwing, hence, plausibly, more in favour of market-oriented and pro-firm policies than of state 
(and regulators’) interventions in the economy. We contribute two reasons why this negative sign 
makes sense. On the one hand, if rightwing governments are more oriented to promote easier access 
to capital markets than leftwing governments, then firms will find it easier and less expensive to tap 
the stock market for funds, and will therefore raise equity rather than debt. On the other hand, if 
rightwing executives tend to be more pro-firm than pro-consumer, firms will be less in need of 
pursuing the strategic use of leverage in order to obtain more favourable regulatory decisions.     
We then include the regulatory variables. In Column (3), the OECD market entry index tests 
whether changes in potential competition may affect capital structure decisions. Faced with higher 
competitive pressure, firm leverage may increase or decrease. On the one hand, market competition 
may substitute regulatory interventions as far as the pricing mechanism is concerned, leading firms 
to reduce their debt levels whenever i) debt is no longer an instrument to influence the regulator in 
the rate setting decisions (as per Spiegel and Spulber, 1994) or ii) high leverage is viewed as a sign 
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of vulnerability in a fully deregulated market25. On the other hand, the competitive pressure might 
spur the PTOs to urge the regulator to keep regulated charges high, by increasing their financial 
exposition and their bankruptcy risk. It is in fact plausible that competition induces operators to 
increase investment, which in turn increases their financial requirements. However, the estimated 
coefficient on Market Entry is insignificant, supporting neither of these hypotheses.  
Finally, in Column (4) we add the Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity. The positive and 
significant coefficient on the Index suggests that telecom operators have raised their leverage not 
only to finance corporate growth strategies, but also as a reaction to an increasingly heavy 
regulation.26  The coefficient of 0.595 indicates that the impact of a change in regulatory intensity 
on leverage is quite large. If the Plaut index increases from the minimum value, 0.289, to the mean 
value, 0.510, the expected leverage increase would be of 13.1 percentage points (0.595*0.221). 
Given that the sample leverage is 31.7% on average, this would imply an increase to 44.8%.  In 
section 5.2, building on the evidence that leverage does increase as a response to increasing 
regulatory intensity, we will test the core prediction of Hypothesis 1 that regulated prices increase 
as leverage increases. 
An inspection of our data confirms the econometric evidence.  In Spain, the Plaut Index 
rises from 0.4 to 0.66 between 1997 and 2005. In the same period, Telefonica de Espana doubles its 
leverage, from 35% to 68%.  In Italy, the scope and intensity of regulation sharply increased soon 
after the set up of the national Regulatory Authority. As the Plaut Index rose from 0.37 in 1997 to 
0.7 in 2000, the financial leverage of Telecom Italia soared from 46% to 64%, mainly as a result of 
two Leveraged Buy-Outs. Also in France, regulation intensified from 1997 to 2001 (the Plaut index 
roses from 0.41 to 0.68), while France Télécom’s leverage increased from 38% to 70%.  Finally, in 
the UK as the intensity of regulation increased from 0.39 to 0.67, in the 1997-2003 period, the 
financial conditions of British Telecom strongly deteriorated and the leverage, initially as low as 
6% climbed up to 132%, leading the firm to divest its mobile branch, O2.  
 
5.1.2 Investment 
We now analyze the impact of institutional variables on the PTOs’ investment decisions. 
The empirical model derives from the microeconometric literature on company investment which 
                                                 
25 Empirical evidence supports this view. Ovtchinnikov (2010), studying a large sample of U.S. firms in industries 
which were subject to some form of deregulation during the 1966-2006 period, finds that as competition increased and 
markets were deregulated, firms reduced their leverage by about 30%. 
26 This result is consistent with what obtained by BCRS (2011) for a larger and more heterogeneous sample. In a set of 
unreported regressions we also checked whether state vs. private ownership of the firm influences the PTOs’ financial 
decisions. We found that both the private vs. public control dummy and a continuous measure of Government’s ultimate 
control rights were always insignificant in the leverage regressions. Results are available upon requests.     
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suggests to include the lagged investment ratio (IK) to account for capital stock adjustment, demand 
growth (∆LogSales), as measured by the log difference of firm sales, to account for accelerator 
effects, and the cash flow to capital stock (CFK) to account for capital markets imperfections and 
asymmetric information problems that may cause investment decisions to be constrained by the 
amount of internal funds.27 We then add, in turn, Political Orientation, Market Entry and 
Regulatory Intensity to test for the impact of the institutional and regulatory framework. The 
dynamic investment model we estimate is the following:  
 
IKit =α0 + α1 IKit-1 + α2∆LogSalesit + α3∆LogSalesit-1 + α4CFKit-1+ α5CFKit-1 + 
+α6OECDMarketEntryjt(or α6RegulatoryIntensityjt) +α7PoliticalOrientationjt + µi + δt + εit   (2) 
 
where µi denotes the firm dummies, δt denotes the time-specific dummies, i, j and t are the firm, 
country and year subscripts, and εit is the error term. To estimate this model we use the Generalised 
Method of Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which 
is especially designed for dynamic models where right-hand variables, including the lagged 
dependent variable, are not strictly exogenous. 28  
Table 3 reports the results. In Column (1) we test the baseline specification and find that the 
lagged investment rate is insignificant while the accelerator term (the contemporaneous sales 
growth term) is significant and positively signed. The lagged cash flow rate enters with a positive 
and significant coefficient, suggesting that the PTOs are constrained by the available flow of 
internal finance and cannot exploit profitable investment opportunities without raising either equity 
or debt funds, both costing to the firm more than cashflow. This result is interesting for us because, 
by confirming that financial and investment decisions are not separable, it calls our attention to the 
choice firms have to make between debt and equity. Although the pecking order theory predicts 
that, when cashflow is exhausted, debt should be used first and then equity, the cost of equity in the 
period under study was relatively low and many EU manufacturing firms tapped the equity market 
(see, for example, the report on corporate finance in the EU area by the European Central Bank, 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive survey of company investment models estimated with panel 
data and of the debate on the impact of financing constraints on company investment.  
28 GMM estimation also deals with the dynamic panel bias that arises when the lagged dependent variable may be 
correlated with the error term even when the firm fixed effects are wiped out by first-differencing. Our GMM estimates 
employ t-2 lags of the dependent variable and of other non-strictly exogenous regressors, such as the cash flow to fixed 
capital, the growth rate of real sales, and the regulatory framework indexes. To test the validity of the instruments, we 
use the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic under the null of joint validity of the instruments results and we also report the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test to control for AR(1) and AR(2) in the residuals. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors and as instruments.    
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2007). This behaviour is in contrast with what we observe for telecom utilities, which, in spite of 
being very large and widely-held, with larger institutional investors and easier access to 
international capital markets (as compared to manufacturing firms), increased their indebtedness to 
the point of raising the concern of policymakers.        
Turning to the institutional variables, we find, in Column (2), that Political Orientation 
enters with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that PTOs tend to increase their 
investment rates under more conservative governments. Even though PTOs ultimately serve as 
public utilities, most of them have been fully privatized, so it is not surprising that they expect 
rightwing executives will likely introduce pro-firm policies (such as a lower taxation of income) to 
which they react by increasing their investment rates.  Notably, the estimated coefficients on 
Political Orientation in Tables 2 and 3 are both consistent with anecdotal evidence that firms react 
to rightwing executives and to supposedly pro-firm policies by increasing investment and equity 
finance.  
In Column (3), we find that the coefficient of the OECD Market Entry index is negative and 
significant.  Since the index is higher when entry is more difficult, the negative sign implies that 
PTOs tend to invest more as entry in the downstream segment (liberalization) becomes easier and 
markets become wider and more open29. Again this result is consistent with empirical evidence that 
telecom incumbents tend to increase their investment as competition increases (Cambini and Jiang, 
2009).  In order to have an idea of the size of the effect of changes in market entry regulation, 
consider a unit decrease in the OECD Index from Column (3). In the long run, the investment rate 
increases by more than one percent (1.24% to be precise)30. Since the average investment rate is 
15.7% this implies an increase to 17%. If the Market Entry index decreases from its third quartile 
value (3.1) to the first quartile value (zero), then the investment increase would be of 3.84 
percentage points, which is quite large. To seize the magnitude of the change due to liberalization of 
entry, we can also experiment with country specific data in different time periods. For example, we 
can compare firm and industry averages for Germany before and after 1999, as the average Market 
Entry index goes from 4.8 to 0, and find that the investment rate, on average, increases from 7.3% 
to 12.5%. In Italy, across the same intervals, the Index decreased from 5.275 to 0 and the mean 
investment rate increased from 10.9% to 19.5%. Finally, for control, we can look at the UK, where 
entry was fully liberalized from the start (and the index is always set to 0, and find that the 
investment rate did not increased (but actually decreased from 14.8 to 11.8%).     
                                                 
29 Alesina et al. (2005) found a similar result for a panel of OECD countries.   
30 The long-run coefficient is calculated as α6/(1-α1)=-0.0124. 
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In Columns (4) we test whether Regulatory Intensity affects investment decisions, but we 
find no significant results although the negative coefficient suggests that “too much regulation” 
hinders investment, confirming the evidence we obtained from Market Entry in Column (3).31 
 
5.2 Leverage-Price Granger causality tests  
In this section we test the relationship between firm leverage and regulated prices.  If debt is used in 
the interplay between the firm and the regulator as a shield to protect large and sunk investments 
from regulatory opportunism, then we expect that an increase in leverage is followed by an increase 
in regulated rates (Hypothesis 1) and by an increase in investment (Hypothesis 3).   Alternative 
patterns of results might also be conjectured. If regulators use the firm’s cost of capital - based on 
the incumbent’s financial structure - to set the tariffs that will ensure the firm a “fair rate of return”, 
then an increase in price should follow a decrease (not an increase) in leverage, i.e. an opposite 
effect with respect to Hypothesis 1. This is because the firm would choose equity instead of debt to 
raise the overall cost of capital (since the cost of equity is typically higher than the cost of debt) and 
the price as a consequence. After the price is set, if the “circularity” argument literally applies, and 
to the extent that regulators are able to commit to the regulated rates, firms would then increase 
their leverage in order to reduce their actual cost of capital. In this case, we should observe that the 
causality runs the other way round (with respect to Hypothesis 1), i.e. that an increase in leverage 
follows an increase in price, and not viceversa. Further alternatives are that leverage and regulated 
prices are spuriously correlated, as the two variables are correlated with a third variable that causes 
both of them, or that leverage and prices are not correlated at all.  
To investigate the direction of the price-leverage relationship we apply the Granger causality 
test, which estimates the following bivariate autoregressive processes for the firm leverage and, 
alternatively, the country-specific Local access rates, the Single transit access rates and the Retail 
price indexes:   
 
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi LevLevPPP εδµββαα ++++++= −−−−     (3) 
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi PPLevLevLev νδµγγδδ ++++++= −−−−     (4) 
 
                                                 
31 Analogously to the leverage equation, we estimated a basic investment equation where we introduced two ownership 
variables (one dichotomous and one continuous). Again we found that the ownership variables were insignificant. This 
result is similar to what we obtained for a panel of European energy utilities (see Cambini and Rondi, 2010).   
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where Pi,t is the regulated price of firm i in period t, Levi,t is the leverage of firm i in period t, µi 
denotes the firm dummies, δt denotes the time-specific dummies that capture the underlying 
technological change in the industry and the evolution of cost efficiency32, i, and t are the firm and 
year subscripts, and εit  and νit are the error terms in the two equations. These tests are used to 
examine whether leverage Granger-causes regulated prices, or vice-versa.  If leverage Granger-
causes prices but not vice versa, then β1 and β2 are jointly significant while γ1 and γ2 are not. 
Therefore, we also report Wald statistics testing whether Levi,t-1 and Levi,t-2 contribute significantly 
to the explanatory power of regression (3), or Pi,t-1 and Pi,t-2 contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power of equation (4).  As this is a dynamic model, similarly to the investment equation 
in Section 5.1.2, we use the Generalised Method of Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).33  
The results are in Tables 4.A and 4.B. In Panel A, we report the marginal probabilities of the 
tests of the hypotheses that the coefficients of the leverage terms are jointly zero as well as that their 
sum is zero.  The estimated coefficients and the Wald tests show that the lagged leverage terms are 
jointly significant in columns (1) and (3), but not in column (2), which suggests that leverage has a 
positive significant effect on Single transit access charges and on the Retail prices, but not on Local 
access rates.  Notably, Single transit access is the prevailing entry mode in the service-based 
competitive framework that characterized European telecom industry in our sample period (see 
ERG, 2007). For Single transit and Retail tariffs our tests also indicate that the sum of the 
coefficients of the debt terms is positive and significantly different from zero.  In Panel B, we test 
the opposite hypothesis and find that in all columns the coefficients on the once and twice lagged 
terms are insignificant and the Wald tests show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two 
price terms are jointly zero. These results imply that leverage Granger-causes regulated prices both 
at the wholesale (Single transit) and at the retail level, thus indicating that the data cannot reject the 
hypothesis that higher debt leads to higher regulated charges. Our results do not support the 
alternative hypotheses that firms adjust their capital structure to match their resulting expected 
revenue stream, or that leverage and regulated prices are driven by a third variable that causes both 
of them.  
We can use the estimated coefficients of columns (1) and (3) of Table 4A to calculate the 
quantitative effects that a change in leverage has on wholesale and retail telecom charges in the long 
                                                 
32 For a survey on the impact of technological change on telecom operators’ productivity, see Fuss and Waverman 
(2002).  
33 The instrument set for the Granger tests in this section and in the following sections 5.3 and 5.4, includes lags of the 
regressors as well as variables accounting for institutional features of the regulatory and political environment, such as 
regulatory intensity and political orientation. 
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run, allowing for the efficiency progress due to fast technological change. Considering a 10% 
increase in leverage, the long run coefficient of 0.714 (calculated as β1+β2/(1-α1-α2), see also 
Alesina et al., 2005) allows us to estimate that the single transit charge would increase by 0.0714 
€cents per minute, which corresponds to a 6% increase with respect to the mean tariff rate of 1.184 
€cents/min. This apparently minimal price change would generate an enormous increase in total 
revenues (in Italy for example, using the data in footnote 17, this increase would generate a 5.6 
billions Euros increase in revenues from wholesale services). If we use the results in column (3) we 
can calculate the long run effects of a debt increase on the retail price index. Our estimate shows 
that, following an increase in leverage by 10%, the retail price index would increase of 9.62 
percentage points. Since the mean retail index is 110.32, this amounts to an increase by 8.72% 
(9.62/110.32) of the average consumers’ bill.  
Clearly, competition is likely to be negatively affected by incumbents’ financial decisions, 
since an increase in leverage raises the cost alternative operators should pay for accessing the 
existing infrastructure. This is what we analyse in the next Session.  
 
5.3 Leverage-Market Competition Granger causality tests 
In Section 2 we emphasized the potential implications of the causality relationship between 
leverage and wholesale rates for the competition in the downstream retail segment of an industry 
with a vertical structure, like telecommunications. High leverage might display a negative effect on 
competition if the regulator, driven by concerns over the PTO’s, and the industry, financial stability, 
raises the access charge (Hypothesis 2).  In this case entrance in the retail market would be 
discouraged , and alternative operators would have to pay a higher tariff to access the network. The 
reverse might also occur: if market competition toughens, the PTO’s revenue and cash flows are 
likely to decrease and reliance on debt finance might increase. To investigate whether the strategic 
use of debt has a downside effect on competition in the retail segment, we test the relationship 
between PTOs’ leverage and two different variables to proxy for market competition: (i) the 
Number of Competitors in the telecommunications market, as defined by the EC report (2006), i.e. 
the number of operators that, along with the PTO, have a combined market share of at least 90% of 
the global voice fixed telephony market, and (ii) the Market Share of the Incumbent PTO operator 
in the national segment (EC report, 2006). 
To investigate the causality in the relationship between leverage and market competition we 
perform, similarly to section 5.2, the following Granger-causality test:  
 
  21
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi LevLevMCMCMC εδµββαα ++++++= −−−−       (5) 
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi MCMCLevLevLev νδµγγδδ ++++++= −−−−         (6) 
 
where MC is alternatively the Number of Competitors and the Market Share of the incumbent in the 
retail sector and the other variables are defined as in Equations (3) and (4).  
The results are reported in Table 5. In Panel A, Column (1), the once lagged leverage term is 
insignificant, but the twice-lagged term is negative and highly significant. The Wald tests show that 
the two leverage terms significantly contribute to explaining the Number of Competitors and that 
the sum of the coefficients is negative and significant. Before drawing the implications of this 
result, we check in Panel B whether there is reverse causality, i.e. whether lags of the Number of 
Competitors enter the dynamic leverage equation.  This might occur if competitive pressure in the 
retail segment reduces retail prices and deteriorates the profitability of the incumbent operator, 
leading it to increase the financial leverage. The results show that this is not the case, as none of the 
coefficients for the Number of Competitors variable are significant, either individually or jointly, in 
explaining leverage. Overall these results suggest that the number of downstream competitors 
decreases as the PTOs increase their leverage.   
In Column (2) we then investigate the relationship between the PTO’s leverage and Market 
Share in the national retail sector. The estimated results support the evidence from the Number of 
Competitors’ regressions. Financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on the PTO’s 
Market Share, suggesting that the higher the leverage the stronger the dominant position of 
incumbent. The Wald tests show that the two leverage terms are jointly significant and that their 
sum is positive and significant, while the reverse causality test in Panel B shows that the PTO’s 
Market Share does not contribute to explain firm leverage.  Taken together, the results in Columns 
(1) and (2) show that an increase in the PTO’s leverage leads to a smaller number of competitors 
and to a greater market share of the incumbent in the retail segment of the telecommunications 
industry, suggesting that our data do not reject the model’s prediction that the strategic use of 
leverage may also affect the degree of market competition. Being aware that it takes time for market 
forces to trigger entry and exit decisions and to quantitatively affect market shares, we use the latest 
EU reports (European Commission, 2010) to follow the developments of competition in the telecom 
market in the years immediately after our sample period, during which the PTOs’ leverage had 
significantly increased. We find that in many countries the incumbent's domestic market share has 
either increased or remained constant between 2006-2008: for example, in Austria the PTO’s 
market share increased from 55% to 62.4%; in Belgium, from 70% in 2006 to 71% in 2007 (and 
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69.7% in 2008); in Greece from 72% to73.6%; in Ireland from 68% to 71%; in Spain from 74% to 
77.1%; in Sweden from 56% to 58%; and even in the UK, British Telecom’ market share increased 
from 56% to 58% in 2006-07 and then back to 55.5% in 2008. 
5.4 Leverage – Investment Equations 
In the last section we analyze the impact of debt on PTOs’ investment decisions. The 
interaction between capital structure and regulated rates in Spiegel and Spulber’s model has natural 
implications for the typical underinvestment problem that adversely affects network infrastructure 
in regulated industries in the presence of regulatory opportunism.  In their setting, the strategic use 
of leverage is thus justified by the need to discipline the regulator’s opportunistic behavior (i.e. the 
ex-post price reduction) and to enhance firms’ ex ante investment incentives.  If this is the case, 
after empirically observing the positive influence of regulatory intensity on leverage in Table 2, and 
the positive impact of leverage on retail and wholesale charges in Table 4A, we ask now our data if 
there is a positive relationship between leverage and investment (testable Hypothesis 3).  
The relationship between leverage and investment is inherently endogenous, because if a 
firm plans to invest in year t, it may issue debt in t-1 (or even t-2), and if the investment project 
takes time to be realized, then adjustment lags in the investment plan today generates financial 
requirements and debt issues tomorrow. The persisting nature of this endogeneity is difficult, if not 
impossible, to control even if instrumental variable techniques are used.34 Again, we rely on the 
GMM-DIFF estimator to perform the Granger causality test for the fixed investment to capital stock 
rate and a measure of leverage: 
 
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi LevLevIKIKIK εδµββαα ++++++= −−−−   (7) 
,,2,21,12,21,1, tititititititi IKIKLevLevLev νδµγγδδ ++++++= −−−−       (8) 
 
where IKi,t is the fixed investment to capital stock rate of  firm i in period t, Levi,t is the leverage of 
firm i in period t, µi denotes the firm dummies, δt denotes the time-specific dummies, i, and t are the 
firm and year subscripts, and εit  and νit are the error terms in the two equations. If leverage 
Granger-causes the investment rate of the firm, but not vice versa, then β1 and β2 are jointly 
significant while γ1 and γ2 are not. As a robustness check, in Columns (2) and (3) we report the 
                                                 
34 Not claiming to have eliminated this problem, we explore this dynamic relationship by applying (as in sections 5.2 
and 5.3) the Granger test and the GMM-DIFF estimator where we also include regulatory and institutional controls in 
the instrument set. Resende (2009) follows a similar approach to test, for a sample of US telecom firms, the leverage-
investment relationship derived from Spiegel and Spulber (1994). 
  23
results using two alternative measures of indebtedness, the debt to total assets ratio and the debt to 
sales ratio. 
We present our results in Tables 6.A and 6.B. In Panel A, we find that the estimated 
coefficients of the lagged debt terms are jointly significant independent of the definition for 
indebtedness we use. The Wald tests also show that their sum is positive and significantly different 
from zero. In contrast, in Panel B, we find that the investment rate does not significantly contribute 
to explaining the leverage, as the once and twice lagged coefficients are neither individually nor 
jointly significant.  Taken together, these results indicate that leverage Granger-causes investment 
(and not vice-versa), thus suggesting that the data cannot reject the prediction of the model that 
leverage strengthens the firms’ incentives to invest. To understand the quantitative importance of 
these estimates, consider a leverage increase of 10 percentage points, from 0.317 (the sample 
average) to 0.417. By using the coefficients in Column (1) of Table 6A, we can calculate the long-
run coefficient as β1+β2/(1-α1-α2) = 0.464 and use it to estimate that an increase of 10 percentage 
points would lead to an increase of 4.64 percentage points in the investment rate. As the average 
investment rate is 15.7%, this would imply a sizeable increase, to 20.3%. If we repeat the 
experiment with similar increases in the debt to sales ratio and in the debt-to-total assets ratio, we 
find that the investment rate would increase, respectively, by 1.1 and by 3.54 percentage points in 
the long run.   
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have theoretically and empirically analysed the relationship between 
financial structure, access regulation and investment in the European telecommunications market. 
Specifically, since capital structure affects the way NRAs set regulated wholesale and retail charges 
as well as firms’ investment, the regulated firm may use debt leverage to influence the regulator’s 
pricing decisions and, ultimately, the degree of competition in the downstream segment of the 
market.  
Using a panel of 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) over the period 1994-
2005, we have first investigated the impact of key features of the institutional context, such as the 
degree of market openness and the scope and intensity of regulatory interventions, on the PTOs’ 
financial and investment decisions, while also controlling for the potential influence of the 
executive’s political orientation. Our findings show that leverage increases with the intensity of 
regulation while company investment is positively affected by liberalization of entry. We have then 
applied Granger-causality tests to the relationships between PTOs’ financial leverage and i) 
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wholesale and retail rates, ii) degree of competition in the retail service sector and, iii) company 
investment. The results show that the model’s predictions cannot be rejected by our data. We find 
that an increase in leverage positively affects regulated rates, both at the retail and at the wholesale 
level. Furthermore, as an effect of the higher wholesale charges, increases in leverage also have a 
negative impact on competition. In particular we find that higher leverage leads to a lower number 
of competitors in the national market and to a larger PTO’s market share in the retail service sector. 
Finally, we find that financial leverage has a positive effect on the PTOs’ investment rate. When we 
use the coefficients to estimate the long run quantitative effects of an increase in leverage we find 
that they are quite large. A 10 percent increase in leverage leads, on average, to increases of 8.72 
percent in the retail price index, of 6 percent in the access charge paid by alternative operators, and 
of 4.64 percentage points in the investment rate of the incumbent operator.  This suggests that the 
strategic use of debt to discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated 
network industry may somewhat impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but has a 
favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem.  
More recently, new entry methods, such as local loop unbundling and bitstream services, 
have become increasingly important for the provision at retail level of broadband services. These 
access instruments, which are used by entrant operators to provide enhanced value-added services, 
are viewed as key determinants of future infrastructure investments in the telecom industry. 
Whether capital structure decisions will still continue to interfere with the new access services’ 
regulated charges and, in turn, influence infrastructure investment in the next generation networks is 
an issue that deserves further investigations. 
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FIGURE 1 – BOOK LEVERAGE OF EU PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS (PTOS) 
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FIGURE 2  - AVERAGE INVESTMENT RATE OF  EU PTOS 
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TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS 
15 PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS (PTOS) 1994 – 2005 
 
  Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
Telecoms’ Retail Price Index 110.316 10.108 94.1 144.69 138 
Local access charge (€cents/min) 0.801 0.361 0.23 3.23 114 
Single Tandem access charge (€cents/) 1.184 0.430 0.35 3.26 114 
Incumbent’s national market share (%) 77.08 14.656 50.0 100.0 126 
Number of competitors 3.703 3.004 0 12 128 
Investment Rate  0.157 0.106 -0.166 0.578 127 
Leverage  0.317 0.223 0.000 1.000 157 
Debt-to-sales  0.479 0.834 0.000 7.125 157 
Debt-to-total assets  0.199 0.309 0.000 2.982 157 
Total Assets (log) (Mill. of 2005 dollars) 12.110 1.343 8.038 14.256 158 
Fixed to Total Asset  0.507 0.178 0.129 0.835 158 
EBIT-to-Asset   0.071 0.118 -0.976 0.299 155 
Non-Debt Tax Shield  0.733 1.804 -2.608 19.388 155 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock  0.177 0.157 -0.939 0.464 143 
Sales Growth  0.045 0.148 -0.476 0.497 142 
      
Political Orientation 5.487 1.294 3.665 8.025 158 
OECD Entry 1.307 2.191 0 6 158 
Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity 0.510 0.119 0.289 0.753 127 
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TABLE 2 -  LEVERAGE EQUATION FOR EU TELECOMS (1994-2005) 
Leverage is defined as the sum of short and long-term financial debt divided by the sum of short-, long-term 
financial debt and equity. Fixed effects estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.   
 
Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of real total assets 0.122** 0.146** 0.141** 0.110a 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.072) 
Fixed-to-Total Assets -0.489*** -0.432*** -0.448*** -0.412** 
 (0.143) (0.148) (0.146) (0.189) 
EBIT-to-Total Assets 0.086 0.110 0.112 0.091 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.127) (0.145) 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Political Orientation  - -0.023** -0.023** -0.037** 
 - (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
OECD Index – Market entry - - 0.006 - 
 - - (0.011) - 
Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity - - - 0.595* 
 - - - (0.332) 
     
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
R squared within 0.405 0.405 0.422 0.297 
     
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [154] 16 [154] 16 [154] 16 [126] 
 
a p value = 0.128 
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TABLE 3– DYNAMIC INVESTMENT MODEL OF EU TELECOMS (1994-2005) 
The dependent variable is the ratio between fixed investment and fixed capital stock at replacement value. 
Dynamic Panel estimation, one-step difference GMM. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.   
 
Fixed Investment to Capital Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Investment to Capital Stock t-1 -0.213 -0.145 -0.210 -0.202 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.183) (0.267) 
Sales Growth t 0.625*** 0.585*** 0.632*** 0.550** 
 (0.174) (0.194) (0.172) (0.263) 
Sales Growtht-1 0.049 0.019 0.060 0.023 
 (0.157) (0.174) (0.144) (0.208) 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock t 0.064 0.030 0.030 0.050 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.146) (0.205) 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock t-1  0.525*** 0.541*** 0.536*** 0.562** 
 (0.169) (0.175) (0.164) (0.256) 
Political Orientation - 0.023** 0.028** 0.024* 
 - (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
OECD entry - - -0.015** - 
 - - (0.007) - 
Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity - - - -0.209 
 - - - (0.646) 
     
     
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.034 0.021 0.010 0.055 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.254 0.129 0.114 0.184 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.326 0.530 0.821 0.481 
N. Firms [N. obs.] 16 [79] 16 [79] 16 [79] 15 [69] 
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TABLE 4 - PANEL A – REGULATED PRICE AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
Leverage is defined as the sum of short and long-term financial debt divided by the sum of short-, long-term 
financial debt and equity. Each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests as in eqs. [3] and 
[4] of the relationship between Leverage and Regulated Prices.  We present results for the Single transit charge in 
column (1), for the Local transit charge in column (2), and for the Retail price index in column (3). Dynamic 
panel estimation, one-step difference GMM estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation.        
Dependent variable: Regulated Price 
(1) 
Single Transit  
(2) 
Local Transit 
(3) 
Retail Price 
α1 Regulated Pricet-1  0.900*** 0.743** 0.390** 
 (0.078) (0.083) (0.168) 
 α2 Regulated Pricet-2 0.009 0.044 0.421* 
 (0.058) (0.023) (0.228) 
β1 Leveraget-1 -0.054 -0.048 7.932** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (3.344) 
 β2 Leveraget-2 0.109** 0.08235 10.250** 
 (0.052) (0.057) (3.914) 
    
P-value test on H0: β1 = β2 = 0 5.15 (0.076)* 2.11 (0.34) 4.35 (0.03)** 
P-value test on H0: β1 + β2 = 0 3.21(0.073)* 0.99 (0.32) 8.68 (0.01)*** 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.005 0.063 0.914 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.193 0.513 0.062 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 0.998 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [83] 15 [83] 15 [88] 
 
. 
TABLE 4 PANELB – LEVERAGE AND REGULATED PRICE – GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable:  Leverage 
(1) 
Single Transit  
(2) 
Local Transit 
(3) 
Retail Price 
δ1 Leveraget-1 0.465** 0.475** -0.430 
 (0.200) (0.199)   (0.338) 
δ2 Leveraget-2 0.500** 0.508** -0.275 
 (0.199) (0.209) (0.245) 
γ1 Regulated Pricet-1 -0.001 -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.072) (0.109) (0.005) 
γ2 Regulated Pricet-2 -0.049 -0.041 0.001 
 (0.081) (0.051) (0.011) 
    
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0 0.82 (0.664) 1.26 (0.53) 0.30 (0.74) 
    
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.025 0.027 0.384 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.216 0.222 0.102 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 1.000 1.000 0.997 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [83] 15 [83] 15 [88] 
                                                 
35 P-value = 0.14 
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TABLE 5 PANEL A – COMPETITION IN TLC AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
In both tables, each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests of the relationship 
between Measures of Competition in EU TLC industry and Leverage, as in eqs. [5] and [6]. Column (1) 
presents results for the relationship between Leverage and the Number of Competitors in the retail segment. 
Column (2) presents results for the relationship between Leverage and the Market Share of the Incumbent 
PTO operator in the retail segment. Dynamic panel estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. Standard 
errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. 
Dependent variable: Competition Measure  
(1) 
Number of 
Competitors 
(2) 
Market Share of the 
Incumbent 
α1 Competition Measuret-1  0.717*** 0.972*** 
 (0.180) (0.088) 
α2 Competition Measuret-2 0.246 -0.006 
 (0.211) (0.104) 
β1 Leveraget-1 1.722 5.364** 
 (1.028) (2.388) 
β 2 Leveraget-2 -3.567*** 4.468 
 (1.206) (6.465) 
   
P-value test on H0: β1 = β2 = 0 4.41 (0.03)** 7.98 (0.02)** 
P-value test on H0: β1 +β2 = 0 3.64(0.07)* 2.73 (0.09)* 
   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.014 0.031 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.779 0.362 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 1.000 1.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [95] 15 [90] 
 
TABLE 5 - PANEL B – LEVERAGE AND COMPETITION IN TLC -  GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable: Leverage 
(1) 
Number of 
Competitors 
(2) 
Market Share of the 
Incumbent 
δ1 Leveraget-1 0.604*** 0.571*** 
 (0.139) (0.171) 
δ1 Leveraget-2 0.314 0.342 
 (0.211) (0.200) 
γ1 Competition Measuret-1 0.015 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
γ2 Competition Measuret-2 -0.031 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.004) 
   
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0  1.08 (0.37) 0.32 (0.73) 
   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.006 0.006 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.182 0.486 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 1.000 1.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [94] 15 [91] 
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TABLE 6.A – INVESTMENT AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
In both tables, each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests of the relationship 
between Investment and Leverage, as in eqs. [7] and [8]. Column (1) presents results for the financial 
leverage (financial debt/(financial debt + equity). Column (2) presents results for the financial debt-to-total 
asset ratio. Dynamic panel estimation, one-step difference GMM estimates. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. 
Dependent variable: Investment rate 
(1) 
Leverage 
Debt/(Debt+Equity) 
(2) 
Debt-to-Total  
Asset 
(3) 
Debt-to-Sales 
Ratio 
α1 Investment ratet-1  -0.122 -0.280 -0.208 
 (0.235) (0.289) (0.285) 
α2 Investment ratet-2 0.061 -0.607* -0.599** 
 (0.112) (0.297) (0.267) 
β1 Leveraget-1 or Debt-to-Assetst-1 or Debt-to-Salest-1 -0.026 0.280** 0.085** 
 (0.063) (0.125) (0.035) 
β 2 Leveraget-2 or Debt-to-Assetst-2 or Debt-to-Salest-2 0.518*** 0.388** 0.118*** 
 (0.180) (0.174) (0.043) 
    
P-value test on H0 β1 = β2 = 0 9.79 (0.007)*** 3.07 (0.07)* 3.85**(0.043) 
P-value test on H0 β1 +β2 = 0 5.63 (0.017)** 6.10(0.025)** 7.58(0.014)*** 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.091 0.041 0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.497 0.323 0.817 
Sargan-Hansen test  (p-value) 0.931 0.773 0.880 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [76] 16 [76] 15 [76] 
 
TABLE 6.B – LEVERAGE AND INVESTMENT – GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable: Debt ratio 
(1) 
Leverage 
Debt/(Debt+Equ
ity)  
(2) 
Debt-to-Total  
Asset 
(3) 
Debt-to-Sales 
Ratio 
δ1 Leveraget-1 or Debt-to-Assetst-1 or Debt-to-Salest-1 -0.751 0.280 -0.722*** 
 (0.455) (0.388) (0.254) 
δ2 Leveraget-2 or Debt-to-Assetst-2 or Debt-to-Salest-2 -0.476** 0.362 -0.750*** 
 (0.181) (0.371) (0.203) 
γ1 Investment ratet-1 -0.044 0.203 1.632 
 (0.287) (0.367) (1.201) 
γ2 Investment ratet-2 0.040 0.004 2.770 
 (0.307) (0.354) (1.757) 
    
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0 0.10 (0.91) 0.24 (0.79) 1.28 (0.306) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.263 0.110 0.835 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.860 0.502 0.099 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.980 0.746 0.816 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [90] 16 [90] 15 [90] 
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APPENDIX A1 – A STYLIZED MODEL 
 
Consider a vertically integrated monopoly where the incumbent operates both in the upstream and 
downstream segment of the market. In the upstream segment, the incumbent manages the telecoms 
network, the essential input of the industry. In the downstream segment the incumbent firm 
competes with alternative operators for providing retail services to final users. Following Laffont 
and Tirole (1994), the incumbent is regulated both at wholesale (access charge) and retail level; 
moreover, the incumbent faces a competitive fringe in the potentially competitive markets.36  In 
order to provide the retail service, both the downstream unit of the incumbent and all alternative 
operators have to buy access to the existing infrastructure. We assume that for providing one unit of 
final services each operator needs one unit of access. Denote the access charge with a and the 
access unit cost faced by the incumbent with c. We assume – to simplify – that the cost of providing 
retail services (cr) is equal for both the incumbent and the alternative operators. To model the firm’s 
choice of capital structure, we assume that the firm’s upstream costs are subject to random cost 
shocks. Therefore, the upstream unit cost faced by the vertically integrated incumbent operator is 
given by c(1–z), where z is a random variable distributed uniformly over the unit interval. Hence, 
higher values of z correspond to “better” states of nature. Differently from Spiegel (1994), the 
random shock here impacts directly on the access cost and in turn on the regulated wholesale charge 
but only indirectly on regulated retail charges. 
Consider for simplicity (but without a serious loss of insights) that the market faces a unit 
demand function. The consumers’ willingness to pay depends on the firm’s investment level, k, and 
is given by a twice differentiable function V(k), with 0>∂∂ kV , 022 <∂∂ kV . k can be interpreted 
as a measure of the “quality” of the firm’s product or the range of its services. Using p to denote the 
regulated retail price, consumers’ surplus is given by CS(k, p) = V(k) – p. The (unit) market demand 
is shared among the firms; denote with, QI and QE the quantity supplied downstream by the 
incumbent and by alternative operators as a whole, respectively, where QI + QE = 1. Finally, let c < 
V(0).  
Let D denote the face value of the firm’s debt, which the firm needs to cover from its 
revenue. The operating income of the regulated firm can now be written as the sum of the retail and 
                                                 
36 The assumption on fringe competition is made here for expositional purpose and leads us to get clear results and to 
derive well specified testable predictions. A similar assumption is used also in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) for 
similar reasons. 
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wholesale profits. As  the retail profit is equal to (p – a - cr)QI and the wholesale profit is (a – c(1 - 
z))(QI + QE), the operating profit of the incumbent is: 
 
πI (p, a, z) = )())1(()())1(( pQzcapQzccp EIr −−+−−−     (A1) 
 
while the operating profit of the alternative operators is: πE(p,a) = .)( Er Qcap −−  It is 
straightforward to note that competition in the market is asymmetric: the vertically integrated 
incumbent pays the marginal cost for the provision of the final service, i.e. )1( zccr −+ , while the 
marginal cost of alternative operators’ includes the regulated access charge, i.e. rca + , that could 
differ from the underlying cost of access.  
Since alternative operators are price takers in the downstream market, they produce till the 
point in which their marginal cost equates the retail price, i.e. rcap +=  (see Laffont and Tirole, 
1994).  
For a given debt obligation D and regulated rates p and a, let z*(p, a, D) denote the critical 
state of nature above which the incumbent can pay D in full.  z*(p, a, D) is generally given by: 
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Equation (A2) implies that as long as the revenues ( EI aQpQ + ) cover the debt obligation 
and the cost, then the probability of financial distress is zero. If the revenues are larger than the debt 
obligation but lower than the sum of debt and operating costs, the probability of financial distress is 
positive. If the sum of retail and wholesale revenues does not fully cover the debt obligation and the 
downstream retail costs even when the cost for providing the access is zero, then the probability of 
financial distress is 1. Note that this probability increases with D and decreases with p and a. Since 
rcap += , instead of using p, we now rewrite the model using a as the main variable. Equation (2) 
becomes: 
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Let T be the (fixed) cost of financial distress which occurs when the firm fails to meet its 
debt obligation. We can now rewrite the expected profit of the regulated vertically integrated firm 
as follows: 
 
),,(*)())1(()1(),,(
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Substituting for z*(a,D) from equation (A3) and rearranging, yields: 
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It is worth noting that, under the assumption that the incumbent competes with a fringe, 
equations (A4) and (A5) correspond to the profit function of a pure monopolist in Spiegel (1994, 
pag. 301). In other words, adapting the Spiegel (1994)’s model to a framework with a vertically 
integrated and regulated incumbent facing downstream competition by a fringe, we are able to 
recover the original results of Spiegel (1994), with the only difference that in our model the 
(directly) regulated price is the access charge while the retail tariff is indirectly set through a. Given 
that our main purpose is to obtain testable predictions, we now determine the relationship between 
the optimal regulated access price and the debt, D. This will also allow us to derive predictions on 
the impact of D on the degree of market competition. On the contrary, since the framework is 
analogous, we refer the reader to Spiegel (1994) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994) for the technical 
derivation of the optimal choice of the capital structure and investment. 
Following Spulber (1989), we assume that the wholesale price is determined by bargaining 
between the firm which is interested in maximizing its profit and the regulator who is interested in 
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maximizing consumers’ surplus.37 Using the generalized Nash-bargaining solution, the regulated 
wholesale price is given by: 
γγ π −= 1),())(,(max DaapkCSArg
a
     (A6) 
where )(),(),( aDaDa EI πππ +=  is the aggregate profit of the industry. The parameter γ captures 
the regulatory climate: the higher γ is, the more pro-consumer the regulator is.  
The strategic interaction between the firm and the regulator evolves in three stages. In stage 
1, the firm chooses its investment level, k, and its debt level, D. If the funds raised by issuing D are 
insufficient to finance k, the firm can raise additional funds by issuing equity. In stage 2, the market 
value debt (and possibly equity) is determined in a competitive capital market. In stage 3, given k 
and D, the regulated wholesale charge (a) is set by the regulator. Finally, the random variable z is 
realized, output is produced, and payments are made. 
The optimal regulated access charge a*(D, k) is determined trading off consumer surplus 
against the expected cost of financial distress. The proof of existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium would follow the lines of a similar proof of Spiegel (1994; see the Appendix, page 
316). Thus, after maximizing condition (A6), and using condition (A5), we obtain the optimal 
wholesale rate as follows: 
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where,  ccckVkM r −+−−≡ 2)1)()(()(1 γγ ,  
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37 We assume that in the bargaining game the competitive fringe does not play any active role. In other words, we 
implicitly consider that the regulator acts not only on the behalf of the final users, but also on the behalf of alternative 
operators as a whole (the competitive fringe). Alternatively, we might think of revising the Nash bargaining game to 
take into account that in regulated industries not only the incumbent, but also the entrants try to influence the regulatory 
outcome. In this case, one would need to deal with a Nash bargaining solution with three participants, the incumbent, 
the regulator and a competitive fringe. This approach however would make the analysis much more complex and, more 
importantly, less in line with the aim of our empirical strategy focused on the incumbents’ strategic interaction with the 
regulator. We believe that our approach not only simplifies the framework, but it also fits better the market conditions 
we observe in the EU telecom industry immediately after the introduction of market reforms, where alternative 
operators were typically weak competitors and were highly supported by NRAs. 
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This solution holds ad long as 2/)0(
)0(
cV
cV
−
−<γ . From equation (A6) we can draw some insights on 
the relationship between debt D and the regulated wholesale (and indirectly retail) charge: as long 
as the debt level is relatively low, i.e. )(1 kMD ≤ , then the social optimal access charge is not 
affected by D. As long as debt increases, the regulator decides to raise the wholesale charge in order 
to avoid financial distress, and so we obtain a = D + c. However, this only applies up to a limit, 
since an excessively high access charge would negatively affect the consumer surplus. Therefore, as 
long as debt increases, i.e. in the range )()( 32 kMDkM ≤< , the regulator no longer finds optimal to 
increase the access charge with D on a 1:1 basis because of its negative impact on the consumer 
surplus. Finally, when debt is too high ( )(3 kMD > ), the probability of financial distress is 1. Since 
bankruptcy is now inevitable, there is no reason to incorporate any longer the debt in the access 
charge and therefore the regulated access charge is constant with D, but it is affected by the cost of 
financial distress T. It is immediate to see that the regulated access charge is positively affected by 
the debt level, D, as long as leverage is within some threshold level. Moreover, since the regulated 
retail price is equal to rcap += , then also p is positively affected by D. Therefore, our first 
testable prediction is that the regulated wholesale charges and retail prices both increase with the 
firm’s debt.  
Now, notice that the quantity sold by alternative operators depends on the marginal cost they 
face, i.e. ))(( rE capQ + . Since, in the relevant range of D, 0* >∂
∂
D
a , 0
*
>∂
∂
a
p  and 0<∂
∂
p
QE , we 
obtain that the higher the access charge the lower the unit sold by alternative operators (given their 
increasing marginal costs) while, in contrast, the marginal cost of the vertically integrated 
incumbent (c + cr) does not change. As long as debt affects the regulated access charge, it will also 
negatively influence the degree of market competition, as the market position of the incumbent will 
become stronger and that of the alternative operators will be weaker (i.e. 0<∂
∂
D
QE ). We thus derive 
the second testable prediction: market competition in the retail segment gets weaker as long as the 
regulated firm issues more debt. 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between debt and investment. From this point onwards, 
our stylized model corresponds exactly to the Spiegel and Spulber (1994)’s and Spiegel (1994)’s. In 
their model, k and D are simultaneously chosen by the firm in the first stage. Since we do not add 
any significant contribution to/ this part of the analysis we prefer, for reasons of space, not to 
include further calculus here and directly refer the reader to  Spiegel (1994)’s Section 3.2-3.3-3.4 
for additional details.  In sum, the Authors find that the investment level is always below the social 
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optimal level, which implies that the regulated firm still under-invests even if debt is issued. 
However, insofar as debt is used as a commitment device to limit the regulator ex post opportunism, 
the ex-ante incentives to invest will be enhanced, and this will lead a leveraged regulated firm to 
invest more than an all-equity-firm. Therefore, from the empirical point of view, we expect ex post 
a positive relationship between investment and debt, i.e.  0>∂
∂
D
k . This is our third empirical 
prediction. 
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APPENDIX A2 – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definitions      
  
Investment Rate  Gross fixed investment/Capital Stock at replacement value  
Leverage (Short and long term financial debt)/(Book Equity+ST+LT financial debt)
Debt-to-sales (Short and long term financial debt)/(Sales) 
Debt-to-total assets (Short and long term financial debt)/(Total Assets) 
Total Assets (log) Log of real total assets 
Real sales (log) Log of real sales 
Tangibility Net fixed assets/ Total Assets 
EBIT-to-Asset  Earnings before interests and taxes/Total Assets 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (Depreciation and amortization)/Total Assets 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock Cash Flow/Capital Stock at replacement value 
  
 
 
APPENDIX A3 - SAMPLE FIRMS 
 
Company Name Country Sample Period 
   
Telekom Austria AG Austria 1998 – 2005 
Belgacom SA Belgium 1994 – 2005 
TeleDanmark AS Denmark 1994 – 2005 
Sonera Finland 1997 – 2002 
France Telecom France 1994 – 2005 
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany 1994 – 2005 
OTE (Hellenic Telecom Organization) Greece 1994 – 2005 
EIRCOM Ireland 1999 – 2005 
Telecom Italia SpA Italy 1994 – 2005 
Koninklijke KPN NV Netherlands 1994 – 2005 
Portugal Telecom SA Portugal 1994 – 2005 
Telefonica de Espana SA Spain 1994 – 2005 
Telia AB Sweden 1997 – 2005 
British Telecommunications PLC UK 1994 – 2005 
Kingston Communications UK 1998 – 2005 
 
 
 
